This is the most secure and standard practice. It uses zone-based control (untrust to DMZ), specifies the exact required services (HTTP/HTTPS), and relies on the implicit deny rule to block everything else. Option A is too permissive with ‘any’ source. Option C is insecure as it first allows ‘any’ service. Option D is overly restrictive and not practical for a public web server.

This approach directly addresses the root cause by filtering out the noisy, low-value logs (successful outbound web traffic) while retaining the ability to log denied sessions, attacks, and other critical events. Option A loses all visibility for that traffic. Options B and D are administrative workarounds that don’t solve the problem of log noise and make finding real threats harder.

The priority is containment to prevent potential data exfiltration or lateral movement. Isolating the host stops the active command-and-control communication and allows for safe forensic analysis. Option A is disruptive to the entire network. Option C is a preventative measure for the future, not an immediate response. Option D is negligent; a botnet detection is a high-severity alert that must be investigated.

For IKE Phase 1 to establish, the peers must be able to authenticate each other. The pre-shared key (PSK) is the shared secret used for this authentication, and the peer’s IP address identifies who to negotiate with. Mismatches here will cause immediate failure. While Phase 2 parameters (Option C) must also match, Phase 1 must succeed first. Options B and D are internal configurations not directly part of the IKE negotiation.

This is a key architectural point. Local policies (e.g., policies in the ‘local’ zone) govern who can access the firewall’s management interfaces (SSH, HTTPS, Ping, etc.). Zone-based security policies govern the transit traffic that the firewall is routing or bridging between different network segments.

In Huawei’s HRP active/standby mode, configuration synchronization is one-way from the active unit to the standby. When the failed primary (now standby) rejoins, it receives the full configuration from the current active unit (the former secondary) to ensure consistency. Session table synchronization also occurs to maintain existing connections. It does not automatically force a switchback (Option C).

A Service object is a core policy matching element. While it traditionally defines protocol (TCP/UDP/ICMP/etc.) and destination port, on an NGFW it can also be linked to an application signature (e.g., ‘Facebook’, ‘SSL’). This allows for more granular and application-aware policy creation beyond simple port-based rules.

This is a classic challenge with modern web filtering. HTTPS (TLS/SSL) encrypts the URL in the request. Without SSL decryption (also called TLS inspection), the firewall cannot see the ‘facebook.com’ hostname in the HTTPS traffic to match it against the URL filter. It can only see the destination IP address. The firewall must act as a man-in-the-middle with a trusted CA certificate deployed to clients to decrypt, inspect, and then re-encrypt the traffic.

The Server Map is a crucial internal data structure generated when a NAT Server (static NAT) rule is configured. It provides the firewall’s forwarding engine with the pre-defined mapping between a public IP/port and a private IP/port, allowing unsolicited inbound traffic to be correctly translated and forwarded to the internal server. It is not dynamic (like session table for PAT) and not a log.

This is the most secure and standard practice. It uses zone-based control (untrust to DMZ), specifies the exact required services (HTTP/HTTPS), and relies on the implicit deny rule to block everything else. Option A is too permissive with ‘any’ source. Option C is insecure as it first allows ‘any’ service. Option D is overly restrictive and not practical for a public web server.0