While encrypting data at rest is important, the security of the encryption is entirely dependent on the protection of the keys. A policy must address key management (generation, storage, distribution, rotation, and destruction) to be effective. Specifying an algorithm (A) is a control, but without key management, it’s incomplete. Letting the provider manage keys (B) may be a solution, but the policy must define the requirements for that management. Limiting scope (D) weakens the policy.

A core principle of risk assessment is to avoid assumptions. The statement assumes the only threat is from the internet. A professional must consider insider threats (malicious or accidental), compromised internal devices, or an attacker who breaches the perimeter. The response should guide a more thorough analysis of threat scenarios. Blindly agreeing (A) is negligent. Simply documenting (C) accepts a potentially flawed assessment. Mandating immediate patching (D) ignores the risk treatment process, which includes options like acceptance or mitigation.

The Statement of Applicability must be based on the conclusions of the risk assessment. Controls are selected to treat identified risks. You include A.9.2.5 if your risk assessment identified risks related to weak authentication that this control would help mitigate. Exclusions must be justified by the absence of such a risk or the selection of an alternative treatment. Feasibility (A) and cost (B) are considerations within the risk treatment process but are not the primary justification for inclusion in the SoA. User preference (D) is not a valid criterion.

Managing third-party risk is a continuous process. The immediate focus is on impact assessment, but the procedural failure (delayed notification) must be formally addressed through the agreed contractual channels. Reviewing the contract clarifies the obligation, and documenting the delay is essential for supplier performance reviews, potential penalties, and corrective action requests. Termination (A) may be a disproportionate first step. Ignoring the breach of contract (C) undermines your ISMS. Public shaming (D) is unprofessional and could damage necessary business relationships.

ISO/IEC 27001 is a risk-based framework. The most persuasive argument links the control (training) to business outcomes: reducing tangible risks (financial loss, reputational damage) associated with a major vulnerability (human error). This speaks the language of business value and risk management. Promise of 100% compliance (A) is unrealistic. Citing Annex A as a requirement (B) misunderstands the standard—controls are applied based on risk, not mandated. The ‘competitor’ argument (D) is weak and not principle-based.

This is a classic finding of a non-conformity. A documented policy exists but is not being followed. The root cause could be in communication, enforcement, or the policy’s practicality, but the immediate finding is a failure in the ‘Do’ phase of the PDCA cycle—the operation of the control. Ignoring it (A) undermines the ISMS. The audit should trigger a correction and analysis: perhaps the policy needs change (C), but that is a corrective action, not the finding itself. Eliminating the control (D) without risk analysis is irresponsible.

The scope is a foundational element of the ISMS. It explicitly states what the system covers (e.g., specific business units, services, locations, supporting assets). This clarity is essential for applying the risk assessment, allocating resources, defining responsibilities, and ensuring the system is manageable. It is not for reducing cost (A)—exclusions must be justified. It is an internal management tool, not primarily for marketing (C) or just for auditors (D), though auditors will review it.

The risk-based approach requires evaluation, not assumption. The new system and its controls must be subjected to the organization’s risk assessment process. This will determine if the unique authentication method presents an unacceptable risk that requires treatment (e.g., enhancement, replacement) or if it is an acceptable alternative control. Mandating change before assessment (A) is not risk-based. Granting indefinite exceptions (C) creates policy bypasses. Assuming past security (D) is a dangerous assumption that the standard explicitly guards against.

“Risk acceptance” is a legitimate treatment option within ISO/IEC 27001. The non-conformity likely exists because the process was not followed or documented. The correct response is to show that the risk was evaluated, the acceptance criteria were met (e.g., cost of treatment > potential impact), and the decision was made by the appropriate authority (e.g., risk owner, management). This completes the risk treatment record. Disputing (A) is wrong if acceptance wasn’t documented. Falsifying a mitigation (B) is unethical. Deleting risks (D) hides them from management review.

While encrypting data at rest is important, the security of the encryption is entirely dependent on the protection of the keys. A policy must address key management (generation, storage, distribution, rotation, and destruction) to be effective. Specifying an algorithm (A) is a control, but without key management, it’s incomplete. Letting the provider manage keys (B) may be a solution, but the policy must define the requirements for that management. Limiting scope (D) weakens the policy.0