The pattern of randomized, non-existent subdomains (e.g., ‘asd123.legitdomain.com’, ‘xyz789.legitdomain.com’) is a classic signature of DNS tunneling, where data is encoded into DNS queries to bypass traditional firewall controls for data exfiltration or command-and-control communication. While other options are possible, this pattern strongly points to tunneling as the primary security threat.

Syslog collection directly from the database application (e.g., Oracle Alert logs, MySQL error logs) provides the richest, most application-specific context, including user login attempts, SQL query errors, privilege escalations, and data access patterns. While WMI and SNMP provide OS-level data, and NetFlow provides network metadata, application syslog is essential for deep database security monitoring.

Without a grouping key (such as `src_ip` or `user`), the rule will look for *any* failure events and *any* success event globally within the time window, not necessarily from the same source. Adding a grouping key ensures the correlation engine only matches failure and success events that share the same attribute (e.g., the same IP address), which is crucial for the logic of this rule.

A Correlation Rule would detect the event (user added to Domain Admins). A Business Service (representing the AD domain, for example) can have a maintenance schedule defined (8 AM-5 PM, Mon-Fri). The correlation rule can then be configured to trigger only when the event occurs and the associated Business Service is NOT in a maintenance window, perfectly meeting the requirement.

The query `src_ip=10.10.1.45 OR dst_ip=10.10.1.45` will return all events where the host was the source (actions it performed) OR the destination (actions performed against it). Using just `host IP` or `event IP` may rely on specific field mappings. Using just the quoted IP is a broad text search that is less precise and may miss events where the IP is not in a text message field.

Event Filters are the primary mechanism for selectively including or excluding events based on criteria like device group, severity, event type, etc. By creating an Event Filter for the ‘EMEA-Routers’ group with severity >= High, and then assigning that filter to the Forwarding Profile used by the SOAR connector, you ensure only the relevant, high-severity data is sent, reducing noise and bandwidth usage.

The CMDB (Configuration Management Database) is the core context engine. By populating it with asset details (owner, department, location, criticality, installed software), FortiSIEM can automatically enrich incoming events with this information. This turns a generic alert like ‘10.10.1.45 triggered a firewall block’ into ‘CEO’s Laptop (Jane Doe, Executive Dept.) triggered a firewall block,’ which drastically changes the priority and response strategy.

A scheduled Report can be configured to run automatically (e.g., on the first day of each quarter), query all privileged access events for the previous quarter, and generate a document (PDF, CSV). The FortiSIEM system maintains a history of these report executions and outputs, providing perfect, automated, and tamper-evident audit trails for compliance auditors.

For FortiSIEM to accept and process logs from a source, that source must typically be defined as a Device in the CMDB with a valid IP/hostname and be in a ‘Monitored’ state. If the device is unknown or in an ‘Unmonitored’ state, FortiSIEM may discard its logs. This step is fundamental before troubleshooting parsing or service issues.

The pattern of randomized, non-existent subdomains (e.g., ‘asd123.legitdomain.com’, ‘xyz789.legitdomain.com’) is a classic signature of DNS tunneling, where data is encoded into DNS queries to bypass traditional firewall controls for data exfiltration or command-and-control communication. While other options are possible, this pattern strongly points to tunneling as the primary security threat.0