Volatility is the industry-standard memory forensics framework. Its `netscan` plugin is specifically designed to scan a memory dump for Windows network artifacts (sockets, connections, etc.) in a forensically sound manner, reconstructing the network activity present in RAM. The other tools are either not designed for memory analysis (Wireshark reads packet captures, not memory dumps) or are less efficient for this specific task compared to Volatility’s dedicated plugins.

Web server logs record the details of every HTTP request made to the server, including parameters sent via GET or POST. A SQL injection attempt would manifest as an abnormal request parameter containing SQL syntax (e.g., `’ OR ‘1’=’1`). This is the most direct source of evidence for the initial attack vector. While other actions (log analysis, string searches) are part of an investigation, they are less targeted for confirming the specific SQL injection hypothesis.

`pstree -pan` is the most comprehensive option. The `-p` flag shows PIDs, `-a` shows the full command line arguments, and `-n` sorts by PID for clarity. It visually displays the process hierarchy (parent/child relationships), which is crucial for understanding how a malicious process was spawned. `ps aux` and `ps -ef` provide lists but not the clear hierarchical view. `top` is interactive and less suitable for a static snapshot intended for documentation.

A professional forensic conclusion must be factual, objective, and directly tied to the technical evidence presented. It should avoid legal conclusions (“guilty”), vague language (“obvious,” “possible”), or speculation. The correct answer states specific artifacts analyzed (Registry, ShellBags), links them to a user account and action, and provides a precise timestamp and device identifier, allowing the reader to see exactly how the opinion was derived from the data.

The `hash=md5` (or `hash=sha256`) and `hashlog=` parameters are critical for forensic integrity. They instruct `dcfldd` to calculate a cryptographic hash of the input data (the source drive) and write it to a log file. This hash can later be used to verify that the image is an exact, unaltered copy of the original. `conv=noerror,sync` helps handle read errors. The other options create an image but lack the built-in, contemporaneous hashing that provides essential evidence of integrity.

Dynamic analysis (executing the code in a safe, isolated environment) is often faster than static analysis for heavily obfuscated scripts. Process Monitor provides a real-time, system-wide view of the script’s behavior—what files it creates, what registry keys it modifies, and if it attempts network connections. This quickly reveals its intent (e.g., downloading a payload, persisting via registry). Manual de-obfuscation is time-consuming, `-Step` is impractical for long scripts, and searching repositories is passive and may not find a match.

The core forensic value of a full packet capture is its completeness and objectivity. It contains the raw traffic, including application-layer data (e.g., the contents of an uploaded file, the body of an email, or a stolen database record). Server and firewall logs are summaries—they record that an event happened but typically strip out the actual data payload. This makes PCAPs indispensable for confirming data exfiltration, analyzing malware downloads, or reconstructing a full attack sequence.

A direct `adb pull` of the `/data/data` directory (where app databases and private files are stored) requires root or superuser privileges because normal user and app data are protected by the Android security model. Logical acquisitions via backup commands (`adb backup`) or commercial tools often use Android’s backup API or other non-root methods to extract a subset of data, but they cannot directly access all protected storage areas without root access.

In the NTFS file system, each MFT record has two main timestamp attributes: `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` (SI) and `$FILE_NAME` (FN). The SI timestamps (Created, Modified, Accessed, Entry Modified) are more easily altered by user-level APIs. The FN timestamps are updated only when the filename itself changes and are generally harder for common malware to manipulate. The `$SI M` timestamp (specifically the *Entry Modified* time) often records when the MFT entry itself was last changed (e.g., when file content was overwritten), which can be a more resilient artifact. File header timestamps are within the file and can be forged.

Volatility is the industry-standard memory forensics framework. Its `netscan` plugin is specifically designed to scan a memory dump for Windows network artifacts (sockets, connections, etc.) in a forensically sound manner, reconstructing the network activity present in RAM. The other tools are either not designed for memory analysis (Wireshark reads packet captures, not memory dumps) or are less efficient for this specific task compared to Volatility’s dedicated plugins.0