During a CPM password change cycle, the old password is invalidated. If a PSM session is initiated with a cached (now old) password just as the CPM changes it, the connection will fail. This is a common scenario that highlights the timing between credential rotation and active sessions.

The core PAM principle is to never expose credentials. A PSM session with dual-control ensures approval is documented, time-limits enforce scope, and the session recording provides a full audit trail of all actions taken during the emergency access, maintaining security and accountability.

The ‘Verify’ task is a critical safety step. After a password change, the CPM uses the new credential to log on to the target system. This confirms the change was successful and the account is not locked out, ensuring business continuity by maintaining reliable access.

The Session Monitoring policy in PSM allows you to define rules that automatically flag sessions for review based on criteria like target system, account used, or keywords. It can then assign these recordings to specific reviewers, creating an enforceable, auditable workflow for compliance.

The Local System (NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM) is a built-in, operating system-level identity. Its password is managed internally by Windows and cannot be changed by external tools like the CPM. Service accounts should be dedicated domain or local user accounts, which are manageable.

The PSM session recordings are the definitive forensic record. If a connection to the server was made through CyberArk, a recording would exist. The absence of a recording for that user and server in the archive is strong evidence that no privileged session occurred via the PAM system.

Reconcile requires the CPM to log on with a known, valid credential (the reconcile password) to discover the current password on the target and bring it back into sync with the Vault. If this credential is wrong, the reconcile task will fail, even if the main management account is fine.

The PSM holds sensitive credentials in memory during sessions. If compromised, it becomes a high-value target. Network isolation (often via a dedicated management jump-network) limits its communication pathways, containing any breach and preventing an attacker from using the PSM as a pivot point to attack corporate or production systems.

A Dynamic Group in the PVWA is linked to an external directory (like an AD group). You can assign permissions for the entire Safe to this Dynamic Group. When contractors are added/removed from the external AD group, their access to the Safe is automatically updated, providing scalable, centralized access management.

During a CPM password change cycle, the old password is invalidated. If a PSM session is initiated with a cached (now old) password just as the CPM changes it, the connection will fail. This is a common scenario that highlights the timing between credential rotation and active sessions.0