EPM policies are granular. While a ‘Process Operations’ rule can block process creation, it may not inspect or block specific command-line arguments used by an allowed process. To prevent a trusted process (like PowerShell or cmd.exe) from executing a malicious command (e.g., to disable Defender), a separate ‘Command Line Operations’ rule is required to block or sanitize those specific arguments. The other options are less likely: Monitor mode would log, not allow; Trusted Signer would bypass, but the question implies the activity should be blocked; and an uninstalled agent would provide no control at all.

The ‘Lockdown’ policy is a pre-defined, high-security EPM policy designed explicitly for incident containment. It blocks the execution of all processes except for a core set of trusted operating system processes and any applications explicitly defined in its allow list. This allows responders to swiftly halt the attack chain while maintaining the ability to run authorized remediation tools, providing immediate and effective control tailored for this exact scenario.

The Monitor mode is the cornerstone of a phased, risk-based deployment. It allows the EPM agent to log all application and script activity against the defined policy rules without actually blocking anything. This creates a rich audit trail that can be analyzed in the EPM console to understand normal behavior, identify potentially malicious activity, and build a list of applications that should be trusted or blocked in the next phase, all with zero disruption to users.

EPM policies are applied based on Policy Groups. An endpoint’s membership in a specific group determines which rules it receives. The most logical explanation for an allowed activity that is generally blocked is that this particular endpoint (or user) belongs to a Policy Group that has a different, more permissive rule for script execution from the Temp directory, perhaps for a legitimate testing or administrative purpose. The other options are possible but less directly tied to the core policy assignment mechanism.

The ‘Lockdown’ policy is the most efficient and secure fit for this use case. It starts from a default-deny posture, blocking all processes. You then configure its allow list to permit only the specific, approved browser application (and any necessary OS components). This is far more secure and manageable than trying to manually block everything else (option B) or using a default-allow approach with Trusted Signer (option A). Option C provides no technical control.

For an unsigned, internal application, adding its unique file hash to the Trusted Signers list is the standard and secure approach. This grants the application trust based on its cryptographic fingerprint, allowing it to run even under a restrictive policy. It is more precise and secure than allowing all processes in a folder (option D) and is a controlled administrative action, unlike bypassing the policy entirely (option A) or using privilege escalation (option C), which are security anti-patterns.

The ‘Request Elevation’ feature (often presented as a ‘Request Run’ or similar in an agent pop-up) is designed for this exact scenario. When EPM blocks an action based on a policy, it can present the user with an option to request a one-time exception. This request is typically logged and may require justification. It empowers users for legitimate needs without compromising security or forcing admins to constantly tweak the policy. The other options either won’t work (A, B if Desktop is also blocked) or are not permitted user actions (D).

The ‘Forensics’ module (or similarly named investigative component) in EPM is built for deep-dive analysis. Its ‘Process Tree’ visualization specifically shows the chain of process execution, detailing parent and child processes over time. This is crucial for understanding how an initial breach (e.g., a malicious document) led to subsequent payloads. The Alerts dashboard (A) shows policy violations, the Policy Audit log (B) tracks policy changes, and the Trusted Signers list (D) is for management, not event analysis.

The most direct and effective mitigation is to create a targeted rule that blocks the specific vulnerable process. This overrides the general trust granted by its signature. Removing the vendor’s entire certificate (B) might break other legitimate applications. Blocking all Trusted Signers (A) is far too disruptive. Option D is too narrow, as the exploit might not involve scripts. Blocking the main executable stops all abuse vectors through that application.

EPM policies are granular. While a ‘Process Operations’ rule can block process creation, it may not inspect or block specific command-line arguments used by an allowed process. To prevent a trusted process (like PowerShell or cmd.exe) from executing a malicious command (e.g., to disable Defender), a separate ‘Command Line Operations’ rule is required to block or sanitize those specific arguments. The other options are less likely: Monitor mode would log, not allow; Trusted Signer would bypass, but the question implies the activity should be blocked; and an uninstalled agent would provide no control at all.0