The primary security risk is a downgrade attack. An attacker could potentially manipulate the authentication negotiation to force a client device to use the weaker MS-CHAPv2 protocol, which is vulnerable to offline password cracking attacks, instead of the more secure certificate-based EAP-TLS. A secure WPA3-Enterprise deployment should disable legacy, weak EAP methods.

A captive portal with individual user credentials layered on top of the PSK network provides immediate accountability. It allows the shared PSK to provide network access control at the first layer, while the unique portal credentials create an audit trail for individual users. This is a common and practical stepping stone between pure PSK and full 802.1X.

The 4-Way Handshake in WPA2/WPA3 uses EAPOL-Key frames to mutually authenticate the supplicant and authenticator, and to derive and install the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK). The ‘Pairwise’ Key Type and ‘AES’ descriptor (indicating CCMP encryption) are definitive markers of this critical security handshake.

The most secure practice is containment and isolation. A dedicated SSID with the weaker protocol (TKIP) confines the vulnerability to a specific segment. Putting this SSID on a separate VLAN with firewall rules preventing lateral movement to the corporate network contains the risk. Enabling TKIP on any network that also uses AES can create downgrade vulnerabilities.

Cryptographic binding is a defense mechanism used in tunneled EAP methods (like PEAP, EAP-TTLS). It cryptographically verifies that the same client is involved in both the outer (server-authenticating) and inner (user-authenticating) tunnels. This prevents man-in-the-middle attacks where an attacker could establish the outer tunnel and present a different inner authentication.

While other signals can be from neighboring businesses or guest networks, a device that is physically connected to your protected wired infrastructure presents the most direct threat. This ‘impersonator’ or ‘malicious insider’ AP can bypass perimeter security. A WIPS can often detect this by analyzing wired-side MAC addresses or through dedicated sensors, making it the highest-confidence trigger for automatic containment.

The key management problem is the critical enterprise limitation. With a single PSK, there is no individual accountability (everyone uses the same credential), and revoking access for a single user or device requires changing the PSK and redistributing it to all other legitimate users—an operational nightmare at scale. WPA3-SAE improves the protocol security but does not solve this key management issue.

The KRACK attack specifically targets the 4-Way Handshake. By manipulating and replaying the third handshake message, an attacker can trick a client into reinstalling an already-in-use Pairwise Transient Key (PTK). This resets associated packet numbers (nonces), potentially allowing the replay, decryption, or forgery of packets. Patches work by ensuring keys are installed only once.

This violates the principle of least privilege and separation of services. The administrative web interface is a higher-risk attack surface exposed to different threats. A compromise there that leads to private key exfiltration would be catastrophic, as the attacker could then impersonate the RADIUS server and defeat the WPA3-Enterprise authentication. Each service should have its own dedicated certificate.

The primary security risk is a downgrade attack. An attacker could potentially manipulate the authentication negotiation to force a client device to use the weaker MS-CHAPv2 protocol, which is vulnerable to offline password cracking attacks, instead of the more secure certificate-based EAP-TLS. A secure WPA3-Enterprise deployment should disable legacy, weak EAP methods.0