The scenario describes SQL injection, characterized by injecting malicious SQL code via input fields. While input validation is important, the most effective defense at the application layer is to use parameterized queries (prepared statements) and stored procedures, which ensure data is treated as data and not executable code, regardless of encoding tricks.

The immediate priority in the containment phase is to isolate the infected system (in this case, the critical database server) from the network. This prevents the ransomware from spreading to other systems (lateral movement) and causing further damage. Other steps like restoration, forensics, and notification are important but come later in the response process.

WPA3-Enterprise with 802.1X authentication provides the strongest security for a business environment. It uses individual user credentials for authentication (preventing unauthorized access) and mandates the use of AES encryption for robust data confidentiality. WPA2-Personal (PSK) is weaker as everyone shares the same key. WEP is cryptographically broken, and hiding the SSID provides no real security.

The ability to remotely wipe a lost or stolen device is primarily a confidentiality control. Its purpose is to prevent unauthorized individuals from accessing sensitive corporate data stored on the device, thereby ensuring that the data remains confidential.

When a patch cannot be applied immediately, a compensating control like an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) can be deployed. An IPS can be configured with specific signatures or rules to detect and block known exploit traffic targeting the vulnerable SSH service, thereby reducing the attack surface. Changing the port is security through obscurity and is not effective. More scans and documentation do not actively mitigate the threat.

The principle of least privilege dictates that a user or process should have only the minimum levels of access—or permissions—necessary to perform its intended function. After initial access is granted, it should be evaluated to ensure it is not excessive. The 90-day review is part of periodic access recertification, but least privilege should be applied at the time of provisioning. Adding to Domain Admins violates the principle, and background checks relate to trust but not privilege granularity.

This describes a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack. The key characteristics are: the goal is to make a service unavailable (denial-of-service), and the attack originates from many distributed sources (a botnet of compromised IoT devices). The massive, malicious traffic spike overwhelms the application’s capacity.

This scenario requires confidentiality (only the recipient can open it) and non-repudiation of receipt. Encryption (e.g., using the recipient’s public key) provides confidentiality. A digital signature from the recipient upon decryption and acceptance can provide non-repudiation of receipt. Option C correctly identifies this combined approach. Digital signatures alone (Option B) do not provide confidentiality.

In cloud and SaaS environments, the Shared Responsibility Model (or Matrix) is a critical document that explicitly defines which security controls are managed by the cloud service provider and which are the responsibility of the customer. This clarity is essential for a thorough third-party risk assessment. The SLA focuses on performance metrics, the BCP on availability, and a pentest report is a point-in-time assessment, not the overarching responsibility framework.

The scenario describes SQL injection, characterized by injecting malicious SQL code via input fields. While input validation is important, the most effective defense at the application layer is to use parameterized queries (prepared statements) and stored procedures, which ensure data is treated as data and not executable code, regardless of encoding tricks.0