This approach strikes the best balance. Directory exclusions prevent scans of known safe project folders, reducing performance impact and false positives on in-development code. Enabling reputation-based allow-listing (using Symantec’s Insight/Reputation service) allows trusted, widely-used developer tools to run without interference, while still maintaining strong protection against unknown malicious files. Disabling SONAR entirely (A) creates a significant security gap. A full whitelist (B) is administratively heavy for dynamic developer environments. Simply lowering sensitivity (C) reduces security globally instead of using targeted, intelligent exceptions.

The ‘At Risk’ status in SEPM is specifically tied to failures in the System Health Check, which monitors the health of the security environment beyond just definitions (e.g., if the SEP service is stopped, if critical OS updates are missing, if firewall is off). The first step is to investigate the client-side logs to identify the exact failure reason. While a policy push (C) or server service restart (B) might be needed in other scenarios, they don’t directly address the root cause of a Health Check failure. Tamper Protection issues (A) typically cause different symptoms.

This is the standard, supported migration procedure. A final backup ensures a consistent state. Restoring this backup onto the new virtual appliance transfers the entire database (policies, groups, logs, settings). The Replication and Failover Assistant is the correct tool for seamlessly redirecting existing clients to the new server without reinstalling them. Option D describes a piecemeal approach that is error-prone. Option A’s manual reconfiguration is inefficient and risky. Option C’s method using `sepconfig` and DNS change is not the recommended primary method for a full server migration.

Location-specific policies are a key feature for mobile devices. They are applied based on detected IP address or network adapter configuration (e.g., ‘Corporate Network’, ‘Home’, ‘Public WiFi’). When active, they take precedence over the device’s assigned group policy for settings defined within the location policy (like firewall rules). This allows for stricter security on untrusted networks and more permissive rules on trusted ones. They are not limited to firewall (B), are not just for multi-server setups (C), and are not temporary deployment templates (D).

The ‘Incidents’ view in the SEPM console is the centralized log of all security events (quarantines, blocks, cleanups). It allows for precise filtering by date, threat type, action, and group. You can customize the columns displayed to include the ‘User’ and ‘Action Taken’ fields, providing the exact data set required. Exporting this filtered view creates the audit report. The Risk Report (A) is more high-level. The Monitors view (B) shows status, not a historical log. The Compliance Report (D) is for policy adherence, not detailed incident forensics.

The `sep` command-line utility is a powerful troubleshooting tool on the client. The `-status` flag is used to get a detailed, real-time snapshot of the client’s health: which services (e.g., RTScan, SavRoam) are running, the version of definitions, policy update status, and Tamper Protection state. It does not change configuration (A), initiate scans (C uses `sep -scan`), or uninstall the client (D is typically done via `setup.exe /uninstall`).

The most common reason for a policy not taking effect is that the client has not yet received it. The SEPM console shows the ‘Last Policy Update’ timestamp for each client. If this timestamp is older than when the rule was created/published, the client hasn’t applied it yet. You may need to wait for the next scheduled update, restart the client service, or force a policy push. While rule order (B) is important, you must first confirm the policy is on the client. Application Control (C) is a separate feature. Checking network bypass (D) is a later step if the policy is confirmed active but ineffective.

A common failure point for the SEPM service is expired database credentials. SEPM stores an encrypted password for its database service account. If this password expires in Active Directory or the SQL Server, the service cannot connect. The correct solution is to use the dedicated password update utility (`symantec.sepm.passwordupdate` on Windows) to synchronize the stored credential after resetting it in the DBMS. Changing the hostname (A) is unlikely unless recently modified. Java heap issues (B) usually cause performance problems or crashes, not a startup connection failure. Permission issues (D) would typically cause different errors during startup.

The core purpose of a LiveUpdate Administrator server is to act as an internal mirror for Symantec content (virus definitions, engine updates, product patches). Instead of thousands of clients downloading the same large update files individually from the internet over the WAN, they pull from the local LUA server on the LAN. This conserves bandwidth, speeds up deployment, and allows administrators to test and approve updates before releasing them to the production environment. It is not a management console (A), its primary benefit is not encryption (C—though it can use HTTPS), and it does not deploy clients (D); that is a function of the SEPM.

This approach strikes the best balance. Directory exclusions prevent scans of known safe project folders, reducing performance impact and false positives on in-development code. Enabling reputation-based allow-listing (using Symantec’s Insight/Reputation service) allows trusted, widely-used developer tools to run without interference, while still maintaining strong protection against unknown malicious files. Disabling SONAR entirely (A) creates a significant security gap. A full whitelist (B) is administratively heavy for dynamic developer environments. Simply lowering sensitivity (C) reduces security globally instead of using targeted, intelligent exceptions.0