The ‘Web Server Protection’ template provides foundational protection for the underlying LAMP stack (Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP). The ‘Generic Web Application Protection’ rules add a crucial layer for common web app attacks (SQLi, XSS, etc.). This combination offers strong, layered security out-of-the-box. Tuning based on the specific application’s traffic is a standard best practice to ensure compatibility and minimize false positives, making it more practical than starting from scratch (A), a risky detect-only baseline (D), or the unsafe practice of disabling alerted rules (B).

The Deep Security agent is a resilient service that survives operating system reboots. It is a core design principle that the agent automatically restarts with the OS and resumes its protective functions according to the assigned policy. Taking manual actions like uninstalling (A), bypassing (B), or deactivating modules (D) creates an unnecessary and dangerous gap in protection. The correct, hands-off approach is to trust the agent’s built-in resilience.

Deep Security’s Firewall module is the correct tool for enforcing network access control lists (ACLs). The most efficient method is to create a policy with a default ‘Deny’ stance and an explicit ‘Allow’ rule for the required business traffic. Applying this single policy to all POS terminals (likely via a common Security Profile) ensures consistent, centralized enforcement. Option C is functionally similar but less efficient (two rules vs. leveraging the default rule). Option B is decentralized and difficult to manage at scale. Option D is incorrect; while IPS can block malicious *content*, it is not designed to be a primary port-based firewall for policy enforcement.

The ‘Not Supported’ status in Deep Security Manager specifically indicates an agent version compatibility issue. The Manager supports agents within a certain range of its own version. Older agents outside this supported range will still communicate but will be flagged with this status. While connectivity issues (C) or activation problems (D) can cause other statuses like ‘Disconnected’ or ‘Error’, ‘Not Supported’ is a distinct state pointing directly to version mismatch. Geographic latency (A) would not typically cause this specific status.

The ‘Accept Change’ feature is the precise tool for this scenario. It allows you to validate a change and update the integrity baseline for that specific file on that specific server. This prevents future false positives for this *legitimate* change while keeping the rule active for any subsequent, unauthorized modifications. Disabling the rule globally (A) reduces security. Creating a complex custom rule (B) is unnecessary overhead. Option D is not a configurable feature; Integrity Monitoring cannot natively correlate changes with maintenance schedules.

Deep Security Manager’s built-in Multi-Tenancy with Partitions is the architectural feature designed specifically for logical separation in MSSP or large enterprise scenarios. Partitions create complete logical boundaries within a single Manager instance, isolating events, policies, reports, and administrator access for each tenant. While using separate policies (C) or relay groups (B) can be part of a tenant design, they do not provide the comprehensive data and administrative isolation that Partitions do. Activation passwords (A) are for agent-manager trust, not tenant separation.

Effective security monitoring requires tuning to the environment. The best practice is to refine the rule set to reduce noise. This involves editing the rules to look for definitive indicators of compromise (like specific SQL error messages indicative of injection) rather than all query activity. This maintains security value while making alerts actionable. Disabling the module (A) removes protection. Using Detect-Only (B) just hides the problem. Increasing storage (D) addresses a symptom, not the cause of alert fatigue.

Application Control in ‘Learning’ mode is a critical deployment phase where the module monitors and catalogs all executing files (executables, DLLs, scripts, etc.) without blocking anything. This automatically builds a baseline whitelist reflective of the application’s legitimate behavior. This baseline then becomes the foundation for the enforcement policy when switched to ‘On’ mode, ensuring business continuity by only allowing known-good files to run. It is not for blocking (A), attack simulation (C), or performance testing (D).

Deep Security modules serve different purposes. The Firewall module controls network flow based on rules (like blocking IPs). The IPS module inspects the *content* of allowed network sessions for malicious patterns and exploit attempts. A connection to a malicious IP that is blocked at the firewall layer never establishes a session, so there is no packet payload for IPS to inspect. Therefore, no IPS alert is expected. This illustrates the layered defense: Firewall blocked the connection, making deeper IPS inspection unnecessary for that event.

The ‘Web Server Protection’ template provides foundational protection for the underlying LAMP stack (Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP). The ‘Generic Web Application Protection’ rules add a crucial layer for common web app attacks (SQLi, XSS, etc.). This combination offers strong, layered security out-of-the-box. Tuning based on the specific application’s traffic is a standard best practice to ensure compatibility and minimize false positives, making it more practical than starting from scratch (A), a risky detect-only baseline (D), or the unsafe practice of disabling alerted rules (B).0